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A wedding caravan sets out across the high desert of Yemen following the
centuries old tradition of traveling to the bride's village for the wedding
celebration. Shortly into the voyage the joyous procession comes to a horrific
end. The procession is struck by hellfire missiles from drones commanded by
the CIA, killing seventeen people, including twelve civilians and five suspected
militants. '
Having just celebrated his sixteenth birthday, American citizen
Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi, leaves his family home in Yemen to look for his father
in hiding. Accompanied by his seventeen-year-old cousin, Abdulrahman
searches in vain for a month in the remote Shabwa province. Two weeks after
his father had been killed, A bdulrahman, his cousin, and ten other people are
killed by drone strikes at an outdoor cafr in a desert village. The intended
target of the strike, a suspected Al Qaeda operative, was not there. A dozen




The recent killing of one American and one Italian hostage by a U.S.
drone strike has reignited the debate over how to properly rein in the errors and
abuses of the drone program.3 The debate remains stalled, however, between
two ineffective and constitutionally problematic extremes. At one end of the
spectrum, several commentators have called for a special ex ante "drone court"
tasked with approving strikes before they are carried out.4 At the other end are
those who place drone strikes effectively beyond judicial review by
encouraging only internal executive branch procedures.5 This Note stakes out
1. Zaid Ali & Laura King, U.S. Drone Strike on Yemen Wedding Party Kills 17, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/ 3/world/la-fg-wn-yemen-drone-strike-wedding
-20131213.
2. Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, How a U.S. Citizen Came To Be in
America's Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middle
east/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html.
3. Room for Debate: Should a Court Approve All Drone Strikes?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/24/should-a-court-approve-all-drone-strikes.
4. Jeh Johnson and Alberto Gonzalez have discussed this view. See Jeh Johnson, Former
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., Keynote Address at the Center on National Security at Fordham Law
School: A 'Drone Court': Some Pros and Cons (Mar. 18, 2013); Alberto R. Gonzales, Drones: The
Power To Kill, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 52 (2013). Senators Diane Feinstein and Angus King have
also gone on record discussing the possibility of an ex ante drone court, although Senator King would
restrict the usage of the court to authorizing strikes against American citizens. See Scott Shane,
Debating a Court To Vet Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02
/09/world/a-court-to-vet-kill-lists.html; see also Jeffrey S. Brand & Amos N. Guiora, Op-Ed., Judicial
Review of Planned Drone Attacks Would Save Lives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/24/should-a-court-approve-all-drone
-strikes/judicial-review-of-planned-drone-attacks-would-save-lives.
5. Jeh Johnson endorses this view. See Johnson, supra note 4 ("[T]he President can and
should institutionalize his own process, internal to the Executive Branch, to ensure the quality of the
decision-making."); cf Nomination of John 0. Brennan To Be Director of Cent. Intelligence Agency:
Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence of the U.S. S., 113th Cong. 33 (2013) (statement of
John 0. Brennan, Homeland Security Advisor) ("[There is] effort [within the Executive Branch] to try to
institutionalize and to ensure we have as rigorous a process as possible[, and] we feel that we're taking
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the middle ground between the extremes and argues that ex post judicial review
by Article III courts is the most effective constitutional check on the drone
program. Ex post judicial review is the best solution because it avoids the
constitutional and national security problems presented by an ex ante drone
court, while satisfying the separation of powers and remedial requirements
sorely lacking when the executive remains unchecked by the judiciary.
Although ex post judicial review is the superior constitutional choice, it
has been neglected due to the difficulties of explaining how judicial review of
drone strikes would actually work. As the two drones cases heard in Article III
6courts have demonstrated, a plaintiff seeking to challenge the legality of a
drone strike can expect to face a host of justiciability and procedural hurdles
from standing to political question doctrine and sovereign immunity. Moreover,
courts themselves appear to be flummoxed by the question of what law governs
drone strikes and how they should apply it. This Note remedies each of these
difficulties by laying out a litigation strategy for plaintiffs and a legal procedure
for judges. I show that the law judges should apply to drone strikes is the same
international law of war that our judge advocates (JAGs) apply to every strike
carried out by the military. I also show that courts have jurisdiction to review
drone strikes even under the restrictive Alien Tort Statute requirements recently
narrowed by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain7 and Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.8 Finally, I show that while damages relief will not
be available without an act of Congress,9 plaintiffs can win declaratory relief
for strikes found to violate the law of war under the law that now exists.
The Note's argument proceeds in five parts. Part I explains why an ex
ante drone court should be rejected on constitutional, national security, and
practical grounds. Requiring judicial approval for military strikes would
directly interfere with the President's power as Commander-in-Chief and could
jeopardize national security by delaying defensive measures. The practical
requirements of determining the legality of drone strikes also make an ex ante
drone court unworkable. The law of war requires real-time legal determinations
that could not be made in advance by a court.
Part II shows that, despite the recent trend toward executive unilateralism,
our constitutional separation of powers firmly supports ex post judicial review
of drone strikes. The present system of internal executive branch procedures
and limited congressional reporting leaves the executive virtually unchecked.
This governmental imbalance is out of touch with our constitutional values and
the architecture envisioned by our Founders. I argue that ex post judicial review
of drone strikes is the best way to restore our constitutional balance of powers.
Part III confronts the charges that Article III courts are not competent to
the appropriate actions at the appropriate time.").
6. AI-Aulaqi v. Panetta (At-Aulaqi I1), 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014); AI-Aulaqi v. Obama
(Al-A ulaqi 1) 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2010).
7. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
8. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
9. Cf Steve Vladeck, Why a "Drone Court" Won't Work-But (Nominal) Damages Might...,
LAWFARE (Feb. 10, 2013, 5:12 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-drone-court-wont-work
-nominal-damages-might.
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review military action and that, even if our courts were competent, they would
be barred by the political question doctrine from reviewing a case.l0 I show
that federal courts have for more than two centuries applied the international
law of war to uses of military force without interfering with executive
prerogatives or ruling on political questions. Like the due process requirements
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the law of war defines the
requirements of legal deprivations of life and property in war. I show that the
international law of war is federal law under which our courts should adjudicate
the lawfulness of drone strikes."'
Part IV turns to the challenge of demonstrating how plaintiffs can run the
gauntlet of procedural and justiciability challenges to win a merits review of
drone strikes. I lay out a litigation strategy showing that, despite the recent
holdings in Sosa and Kiobel and the barrier of sovereign immunity, courts
should reach the merits of an action for declaratory relief brought by civilians
harmed by unlawful drone strikes.
Finally, Part V shows how courts can actually review concrete cases. I
show in detail how judges can review drone strikes for their compliance with
12
the central law of war requirements of distinction and proportionality.
Adjudicating the legality of drone strikes by determining the military
commander's compliance with the laws of distinction and proportionality is an
eminently legal task that our courts should feel compelled to carry out.
Adherence to the rule of law, our constitutional separation of powers, and our
national security interests all speak for ex post judicial review of drone strikes.
I. EXANTE JUDICIAL APPROVAL IS INADEQUATE, UNWORKABLE, AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The problems posed by the use of drones by an unchecked executive have
led several scholars and politicians to advocate an ex ante drone court as the
proper remedy.13At first blush, ex ante judicial approval, conceived along the
lines of the newly reformed standards for the FISA Court, might seem to be an
effective way of promoting compliance with the laws governing drone strikes.
It would, however, inevitably suffer from a number of shortcomings, each of
which point to the superiority of ex post judicial review.
10. See Johnson, supra note 4; Gonzales, supra note 4; Vladeck, supra note 9; Neal K. Katyal,
Who Will Mind the Drones?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/2 /opinion
/an-executive-branch-drone-court.html.
11. The Paquete Habana is the locus classicus for the idea that "[i]nternational law is part of
our law." 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
12. As I discuss in greater detail in Part V below, distinction requires that "[p]arties to the
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 48, opened for signature June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1]. The rule of proportionality in attack prohibits
attacks "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated." Id. arts. 51(4), 51 (5)(b).
13. See sources cited supra note 4.
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First, while ex post judicial review would not interfere with the
President's powers as Commander-in-Chief, requiring ex ante approval of
drone strikes would be an unconstitutional interference with the President's
duty to defend the nation.14 As a result, national security might be jeopardized
if the President were forced to wait for judicial approval before ordering a
defensive strike against an imminent threat.
Second, as Justice Kennedy argued in Boumediene with respect to
Combat Status Review Tribunals, the closed and accusatorial nature of ex ante
proceedings would be inadequate to ensure against error and vindicate the due
process rights of those targeted.5 When targeting errors occur, only ex post,
open, and adversarial judicial review would be adequate to vindicate victims'
rights, restore the constitutional balance of powers, and reconfirm the U.S.
commitment to the rule of law in military affairs.
Third, and most decisively, ex ante review of drone strikes would be
incapable of adequately assessing the legality of a prospective strike. A strike
that may appear to be legal now may not be legal an hour from now if, for
instance, civilians have entered the target area. Judges giving ex ante approval
would be forced to confront hypotheticals and give advisory opinions on a
necessarily incomplete factual record. They might thus bar strikes that later
circumstances make legal or approve strikes that become illegal in the
circumstances in which they are carried out. 16 Because the actual
circumstances of a strike bear directly on its legality, the FISA Court is a poor
model for review of drone strikes.
Finally, the one concern that might speak on behalf of ex ante approval, a
desire to avoid second guessing battlefield decisions, simply does not apply to
drone strikes.'7 Unlike battlefield decisions taken under threat of enemy fire,
drone strikes are cool, remote-controlled decisions vetted at multiple levels of
command and far from the field of battle.18 Because the lawfulness of drone
strikes is determined by the military's adherence to its own targeting rules, ex
post judicial review of drone strikes would be formally equivalent to a court's
review of any agency's compliance with its own governing rules. By contrast,
14. See Vladeck, supra note 9 ("[I]fthe Constitution protects any [presidential war powers] ... ,
it includes at least some discretion when it comes to . . . the President's power to use military force to
defend U.S. persons and territory .... " (emphasis removed)). Vladeck also notes that an ex ante drone
court would both fail the case or controversy requirement and fail to be subsumable under the warrant
rationale by which the FISA Court operates. Id.
15. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) ("[E]ven when all the parties involved in
this process act with diligence and in good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal's
findings of fact. This is a risk inherent in any process that, in the words of the former Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals, is 'closed and accusatorial."').
16. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Targeted Killing and Judicial Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
ARGUENDO 11, 18 (2014) ("[W]e would never try to decide whether a law enforcement officer is legally
entitled to use lethal force to protect himself or others before he actually does so. The answer, as the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed, would depend entirely on the actual circumstances, necessarily
weighed in hindsight.").
17. Throughout this Note, I refer only to strikes by Predator and Reaper drones predominately
used in the targeted killing of terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.
18. Drone strikes thus fall outside the bounds of 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l)(G), which excepts
judicial review for "military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory." 5
U.S.C. § 701(b)(l)(G) (2012).
2016]
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an ex ante drone court would have no way of determining whether a
prospective strike complied with the military's targeting rules. For
constitutional, national security, and due process reasons, an ex ante drone
court would only exacerbate, rather than cure, the suspicions of illegality and
illegitimacy plaguing the drone program. Proposals for an ex ante drone court
should be rejected as inadequate, unworkable, and unconstitutional.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMAND FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY
FORCE
For staunch defenders of executive unilateralism, imposing a judicial
check on the Commander-in-Chief may seem like a radical idea. However,
judicial review of the executive's military conduct is an eminently conservative
idea, integral to our constitutional separation of powers and judicial tradition.
Justice Brandeis gave one of the best articulations of the purpose of separation
of powers when he stated:
Checks and balances were established in order that this should be a government of
laws and not of men.... The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by
the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among
three departments, to save the people from autocracy.19
Although the latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed an increase
in executive war powers and unilateralism, our greater history and
constitutional commitments repudiate the democratic legitimacy of an
unchecked executive in foreign and military affairs. Such a conception,
befitting the British monarch, was specifically rejected by the Founders and
reaffirmed throughout our history.20 As John Jay wrote in the Federalist
Papers, one advantage a republican union would have over monarchy is
ensuring against wars "not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of
[the] people.' '21 Alexander Hamilton similarly points to the distribution of war
powers between the legislature and president as a check on the despotism
risked by vesting complete war powers in the executive alone.22 Justice
Kennedy recently underscored the paramount importance of separation of
powers and judicial review of military actions in Boumediene:
Security depends upon a sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability of our
Armed Forces to act and to interdict. There are further considerations, however.
Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom's first principles. Chief among these are
19. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 292-93 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[O]n the need for limitations on the power of governors over the governed ...
[the Founders] rested the structure of our central government on the system of checks and balances. For
them the doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity.").
20. See THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay).
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 19 (John Jay) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
22. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). For an extended discussion of
Hamilton's view on the limitations of Commander in Chief powers in The Federalist, see David J.
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem,
Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 796-99 (2008).
[Vol. 41: 155
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freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is
secured by adherence to the separation of powers. . . . Our opinion does not
undermine the Executive's powers as Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the
exercise of those powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial
Branch. Within the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of
judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the res onsibility to hear
challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a person.
Justice Kennedy underscores the extent to which judicial review of
executive branch military action is a fundamental component of the three
branch governmental system outlined by the Constitution. As in the detention
cases to which Kennedy refers, ex post judicial review of drone strikes will not
undermine the executive's power. Rather, judicial review has the power to
vindicate the President's power by demonstrating the lawfulness of the drone
program while restoring our constitutional balance of powers.
Admittedly, the balance of powers envisioned by the Founders and
reconfirmed by Justice Kennedy has partially broken down. Our history has
demonstrated that when separation of powers breaks down, the executive tends
to acquire power at the expense of the other branches.24 With respect to
military affairs in particular, Professors Barron and Lederman argue that
"aggressive claims to executive power left unchallenged have a history of
begetting further and more aggressive claims."2 5 Unfortunately, it is all too
easy to recall what can happen when the executive branch proceeds unchecked
in foreign and military affairs. The last decade alone has seen the executive
employ torture, secret prisons, extraordinary rendition, warrantless wiretapping,
and secret drone strikes.26 With respect to drone strikes, news reports suggest
that some strikes may be carried out in violation of the most basic laws of war
requiring distinction between military and civilian objects, targeting of military
objects only, and the exercise of proportionality and precaution in attack.
27
Rather than vindicating these strikes by demonstrating their compliance with
the law of war, the government has sought to maintain a shroud of secrecy and• 28
deny the judiciary its proper power of review.
As we transition from an active war footing to a permanent counter-
terrorism position, effectively reining in the secrecy and excesses of the
executive by ensuring compliance with the rule of law should be a
29
constitutional priority. As Professor Harold Hongju Koh convincingly
23. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.
24. Cf Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799,
873 (1995) (discussing "piecemeal precedentialism").
25. Barron & Lederman, supra note 22, at 712.
26. See, e.g., EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585
F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009); Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011); Vance v.
Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 195 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013); Al-Aulaqi I, 35 F.
Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014).
27. See, e.g., supra notes I and 3 and accompanying text.
28. See Al-Aulaqi II, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56; Al-Aulaqi I, 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2010); see also
Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Ordered To Release Memo in Awlaki Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/nyregion/panel-orders-release-of-document-in-targeted-killing-of
-anwar-al-awlaki.html (describing AI-Aulaqi 1).
29. See Mark Landler, U.S. Troops To Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016, N.Y. TIMES (May
2016]
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argues:
[H]owever different foreign affairs might be from domestic affairs, that difference
does not exempt them from our constitutional system of checks and balances,
particularly the check of judicial review. If anything, meaningful judicial review is
even more constitutionally necessary in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs.
30
Ex post judicial review of drone strikes is the best way to restore our
constitutional balance of powers by requiring the executive to demonstrate its
compliance with the rule of law when it kills in our name.
Ensuring that our government acts lawfully when it kills in our name not
only affirms our constitutional commitments, it also buttresses our reputation at
home and abroad, secures the cooperation of our allies, and keeps Americans
safer. Both the executive and the military should look upon ex post judicial
review as an opportunity to dispel the suspicions of illegitimacy and illegality
that surround drone strikes and threaten our national security. Suspicions of
unlawfulness have already jeopardized intelligence sharing abroad as several
European officials face judicial review for their involvement with U.S. drone
strikes.31 The withdrawal of intelligence cooperation and mounting civilian
casualties make the U.S. less safe by exposing us to more terrorist threats while
32we lose the public relations battle at home and abroad. Rather than leaving
the fate of the U.S. drone program to foreign and international courts, the U.S.
should welcome the opportunity to get out in front of the controversy over
drone strikes by demonstrating their compliance with the laws of war at home
in the United States. Our constitutional commitment to separation of powers,
the vindication of the drone program, and our national security all speak for ex
post judicial review of drone strikes.
III. FEDERAL COURTS ARE COMPETENT To REVIEW DRONE STRIKES
Despite the long history of U.S. courts reviewing the legality of military
force, the competency question has continued to plague suggestions that judges
should rule on the factual and legal questions arising in the context of drone
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/us-to-complete-afghan-pullout-by-end-of
-2016-obama-to-say.html ("Obama said the withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan would free
up resources to confront an emerging terrorist threat stretching from the Middle East to Africa.").
30. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 223 (1990).
31. See Ravi Somaiya, Drone Strike Prompts Suits, Raising Fears for U.S. Allies, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/3 1/world/drone-strike-lawsuit-raises-concerns-on
-intelligence-sharing.html; Holger Stark, Drone Killing Debate: Germany Limits Information Exchange
with US Intelligence, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (May 17, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational
/germany/drone-killing-debate-germany-timits-information-exchange-with-us-intelligene-a
-762873.html; see also Shaheed Fatima, Noor Khan: A Missed Opportunity?, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 30,
2014, 11:30 AM), http://justsecurity.org/6530/noor-khan-missed-opportunity; Kevin Jon Heller, The
Reprieve Drone Strike Communication I-Jurisdiction, OPINiO JURIS (Feb. 24, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://
opiniojuris.org/2014/02/24/reprieve-drone-strike-communication-jurisdiction. For more extensive
discussion of the negative consequences of the drone program for international cooperation, see Mara
Revkin, The International Costs of Illegality in the War on Terror: How the 2001 AUMF has Alienated
U.S. Allies and Empowered Enemies (June 2,2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
32. See Heller, supra note 31; Somaiya, supra note 31; Stark, supra note 31; see also Ibrahim
Mothana, How Drones Help Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at A35.
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strikes.33 In part to obviate competency concerns, the President has suggested
that an "independent oversight board" (JOB) within the executive branch could
be employed to check drone strikes' legal compliance.34 However, as the
President himself recognized, an 101 is unlikely to improve public confidence
in the legality and legitimacy of drone strikes because the 1OB would not be an
external check and its investigations may not be made public.35 While the
obvious remedy is employing the branch of government constitutionally
committed to reviewing the legality of executive action, some judges and top
government officials persist in the view that "courts are institutionally ill-
equipped to assess the nature of battlefield decisions."36 While courts are
indeed ill-equipped to assess the nature of battlefield decisions, courts have
long demonstrated their ability to rule on the legality of those decisions. As
Justice Barak maintained in the central Israeli case reviewing targeted killing,
Judicial review does not examine the wisdom of the decision to carry out
military operations. The issue addressed by judicial review is the legality of the
military operations. The fact that operations are necessary from a military
viewpoint does not mean that they are lawful from a legal viewpoint. Indeed,
we do not replace the discretion of the military commander in so far as military
considerations are concerned. That is his expertise. We examine their
consequences from the viewpoint of humanitarian law. 37 That is our
expertise.
38
A brief review of U.S. case law shows that American judges have long
demonstrated their expertise in applying the international law of armed conflict
to uses of military force.
33. Vladeck, supra note 16, at 22.
34. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-President-national-defense-university.
The U.K. has adopted a similar approach by appointing an Independent Reviewer of Terrorism
Legislation who is given unfettered access to classified material and who publishes annual reports on the
application of anti-terrorist legislation and makes recommendations for changes. See INDEPENDENT
REVIEWER OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION, https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk (last
visited Oct. 29, 2015).
35. Id.
36. Johnson, supra note 4 (quoting Al-Aulaqi I, 727 F.Supp.2d 1,45 (D.D.C. 2010)); see also
DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Judges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking
vital information upon which to assess the nature of battlefield decisions, and sitting thousands of miles
from the field of action, cannot reasonably or appropriately determine whether a specific military
operation constitutes an 'escalation' of the war or is merely a new tactical approach within a continuing
strategic plan."). Contrary to Johnson's and Judge Bates' suggestions, DaCosta v. Laird is
distinguishable insofar as DaCosta did not concern the legality of a particular use of military force, but
"whether a specific military operation constitutes an 'escalation' of the war or is merely a new tactical
approach within a continuing strategic plan." DaCosta, 471 F.2d at 1155. Contrary to the political or
strategic question posed in DaCosta, the compliance of drone strikes with the law governing armed
conflict is inherently a legal question.
37. The international law of war is commonly referred to as "International Humanitarian
Law." See War and Law, INT'L COMM1IEE OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law.
38. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of lsr. [2006](2) IsrLR 459, 514
(lsr.) (citing HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza [20041 IsrLR 200,
207 (lsr.)).
2016]
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A. History Demonstrates Federal Court Competence in Reviewing
Military Activity
As Judge Wilkey held for the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, in Ramirez de
Arellano v. Weinberger, there is a "long line of cases that permit judicial relief
for unlawful or unconstitutional action by officials of the Executive Branch of
the government, including relief against unlawful actions taken in the context
of foreign and military affairs."39 The "long line of cases" shows that U.S.
courts have displayed remarkable competence in applying the international law
of war to determine the lawfulness of U.S. military action. From Bas v. Tingy
40
and Little v. Barreme
41 to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
42 and Al-Bihani v. Obama,
43
the nation's highest courts have not shied from reaching the merits of the
lawfulness of the U.S. military's deprivations of liberty and property in war. In
addition to establishing the competence of U.S. courts to review military uses
of force for their compliance with international law, the case law establishes the
following four core doctrinal principles: (i) that military uses of force that are
subject to legal review by Article III courts; (ii) that the international law of
war governs military uses of force; (iii) that both citizens and non-citizens have
standing to sue for deprivations caused by U.S. military action; and (iv) that
military commanders are liable for unlawful harm to civilians in war. For more
than two centuries, these principles have formed the foundation of judicial
review of U.S. military action.
Little v. Barreme laid much of the legal groundwork, demonstrating the
judiciary's ability to rule on complex laws governing warfare, to distinguish
congressional and executive war powers, to say when the executive or its
agents have violated the laws governing use of military force, and to provide
damages remedies for non-citizens who have suffered an illegal deprivation by
the U.S. military in war. The Court's decision exemplified the application of
the international law of war to military action to determine whether the U.S.
military acted lawfully and, if not, what the remedy should be. Little concerned
the seizure and subsequent prize-taking of a Danish vessel on the high seas by
Captain Little of the U.S. Navy. Although acting in accord with the instructions
of the President, Little contravened an Act of Congress authorizing the capture
of vessels sailing to, but not from, French ports.44 Justice Marshall did not
question whether a damages remedy should be paid if the executive or its
agents are found to have acted unlawfully. Marshall's only hesitation was
whether to indemnify Captain Little for following orders. As Marshall
confessed, he "was strongly inclined to think that where, in consequence of
orders from the legitimate authority, a vessel is seized with pure intention, the
claim of the injured party for damages would be against that government from
39. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1530 (D.C. Cit. 1984), vacated, 471
U.S. 1113 (1985).
40. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
41. 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170(1804).
42. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
43. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
44. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) at 177-78.
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which the orders proceeded ... . Nevertheless Marshall ultimately held that
Captain Little was himself personally responsible for "damages to the owner of
th[e] neutral vessel" because executive branch military orders that contradict an
Act of Congress "cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act
which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass.' -A6 While
we may question whether personal liability for military personnel can be
generalized from this case, Little continues to stand for the proposition that
non-citizens who suffer an illegal deprivation by the U.S. government in war
are entitled to a legal remedy.
47
The Paquete Habana is another paradigm example of the Supreme Court
applying international law to rule on the legality of military force used against
non-citizens, concluding that a damages remedy is available to those suffering
an unlawful deprivation. The Court analyzed the nature and content of
international law at great length, surveying sources from England and the
48Continent to Russia and Japan. The Court also analyzed the relationship
between U.S. law and international law, famously holding that "[i]ntemational
law is part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination.,49 Here, the Court referred to
customary international law and took for granted that, in addition to
ascertaining the established customary law of war among "civilized nations,
5 °
U.S. courts will apply treaty obligations and other positive law to military
activity. In conclusion, the Court held that "it is the duty of this court, sitting as
the highest prize court of the United States, and administering the law of
nations, to declare and adjudge that the capture was unlawful ....
The Prize Cases form yet another paradigm instance of a U.S. court
applying international aw of war to uses of military force. The central question
taken up by the Supreme Court was whether "the President [had] a right to
institute a blockade of ports in possession of persons in armed rebellion against
45. Id. at 179.
46. Id.
47. Justice Marshall's initial inclination that the government, rather than individual
servicemen, should be held liable for damages when a non-citizen suffers an unlawful military
deprivation was vindicated by Justice Holmes in United States v. The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453,
465-66 (1903) ("[A] decree [for damages] properly may be entered against the United States . . .
according to the rules applicable to private persons in like cases.").
48. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 698-700 (1900). For another example surveying
international law, see Brown v. United States, where Justice Marshall cites the Dutch jurist, Cornelius
van Bynkershoek, the Swiss jurist, Emer de Vattel, and the English jurist, Joseph Chitty. 12 U.S. 110,
124-25 (1814). There, Marshall held that "[i]n expounding th[e] constitution, a construction ought not
lightly to be admitted which would give to a declaration of war an effect in this country it does not
possess elsewhere ..... Id. at 125. Justice Story, in dissent, also discussed international law at length, in
particular Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel. Id. at 140 (Story, J., dissenting).
49. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. The proposition that international law is part of our
law was recently reaffirmed. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729-30 (2004) (citing Tex.
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 388, 423 (1815)) ("For two centuries we have
affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.").
50. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686-712.
51. Id. at 714.
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the Government, on the principles of international law, as known and
acknowledged among civilized States."52 The Court recognized that "[t]he
right of prize and capture has its origin in the 'jus belli,' and is governed and
adjudged under the law of nations."53 On the central issue of whether the North
and South constituted belligerent parties in a war to which other nations could
adopt an official stance of neutrality or become co-belligerents, the Court
reasoned again from international law: "[ijt is not necessary that the
independence of the revolted province or State be acknowledged in order to
constitute it a party belligerent in a war according to the law of nations."
54
These three foundational cases have laid much of the groundwork for
subsequent adjudications of the lawfulness of military activity. A litany of more
recent cases demonstrates the courts' authority and competence to apply the
international law of war to military activity and provide remedies for citizens
and non-citizens alike.55 Since World War II, courts have further established
several of the principles implicit in the early cases, including the key notion of
command responsibility for law of war violations. For instance, in In re
Yamashita, which concerned the prosecution of a Japanese military commander
in the Philippines, the Court confronted the basic question of "whether the law
of war imposes on an army commander a duty to ... prevent[] ... acts which
are violations of the law of war . .. ,56 The Court answered that the purpose of
the law of war of "protect[ing] civilian populations . . . from brutality would
largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could with impunity
neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection."57 Moreover, the
Court found that "the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be avoided
through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are to some
extent responsible for their subordinates."58 Citing the Annex to Fourth Hague
Convention of 1907, the Court found that being "commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates" is a "condition which an armed force must
fulfill in order to be accorded the rights of lawful belligerents.59 These
considerations led the Court to hold that a commander can be held legally
52. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. 635,665 (1862).
53. Id. at 666.
54. Id. at 669.
55. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972) ("[W]hen presented with claims of judicially
cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully
empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation's history or
in this Court's decided cases . . . that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or
threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied.");
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) ("From the very beginning of its history this Court has
recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for
the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.");
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The Supreme Court has made clear that
the federal courts are capable of reviewing military decisions, particularly when those decisions cause
injury to civilians."); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The
Judiciary is fully empowered to vindicate individual rights overridden by specific, unconstitutional
military actions."), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985).
56. 327 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1946).
57. Id. at 15.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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accountable for the actions of subordinates when they violate the law of war.
60
The history of U.S. courts reviewing military uses of force for their
compliance with international law of war demonstrates that our courts are
competent to do the same with drone strikes. The case law establishes not only
that the international law of war is the correct law to apply to drone strikes but
that both citizens and non-citizens can sue when they are harmed by military
conduct that violates the law of war. Moreover, the case law shows that
military commanders are liable when civilians are unlawfully harmed in war.
Contrary to what many skeptics have maintained, judicial review of drone
strikes is not only possible, but a natural development of our legal history.
B. Political Question Doctrine Does Not Bar Judicial Review of Military
Activity
As is well known, courts' competency in holding the military accountable
to international law of war has culminated in a trio of landmark cases defining
the lawful limits of military detention and adjudication.61 Yet despite the
rulings in Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene, courts continue to appeal to
"political question doctrine" to refrain from reaching the merits of cases
alleging the unlawful use of military force.62 Because political question
concerns are so pervasive, explaining how the limits of political question
doctrine have been misunderstood and misapplied is essential to the argument
that judicial review of drone strikes can and should be embraced by the
executive and the judiciary alike.
Some interpretations of the political question doctrine run the risk of
implying that military conduct is wholly beyond the reach of law.63 Such an
interpretation fails to identify the important middle ground between the poles
set out by the D.C. Circuit: "we have distinguished between claims requiring us
to decide whether taking military action was 'wise'-'a policy choice[] and
value determination[] constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of
Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch'-and claims '[p]resenting
purely legal issues' such as whether the government had legal authority to
act."'64 The basic question of whether military conduct was carried out in
conformity to or violation of the law lies between the poles of policy choices
and questions of legal authority. The question of whether a particular military
60. Id. at 16. For further discussion of In re Yamashita and command responsibility, see
MICHAEL NEWTON& LARRY MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-100 (2014).
61. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). On remand from Boumediene, Judge Leon of the D.C.
District Court found that the "Government has failed to carry its burden" in proving that Boumediene
and four others qualified as enemy combatants and thus ordered their release. Boumediene v. Bush, 579
F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cit.
2010).
62. Two recent examples are Al-Aulaqi I, 727 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.DC. 2010), and El-Shifa
Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("In military matters
in particular, the courts lack the competence to assess the strategic decision to deploy force or to create
standards to determine whether the use of force was justified or well-founded.").
63. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 4; Vladeck, supra note 9.
64. El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 844 (internal quotation marks removed).
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action, such as seizure of a ship or bombing of a pharmaceutical factory, was
wise or good policy is indeed a "political" question improperly considered by
the courts.
By contrast, the question of whether the seizure or bombing was lawful
belongs to the most essential function of the courts. Moreover, the legality of a
particular military action is not exhausted in answering the question of whether
the action was undertaken with proper legal authority. The more basic question
is whether the action was carried out in a lawful manner. For example, police
officers with a search warrant may have the legal authority to search a house.
However, it is another legal question altogether whether, in conducting the
lawfully authorized search, the police conducted themselves in a lawful
manner. Even when authorized to search a house, the police are not licensed to
do so in any manner they see fit. 65 They cannot recklessly endanger the
inhabitants of the home, for instance. Similarly, when the nation is at war the
military is authorized to use lethal force against the enemy. They may not,
however, recklessly endanger enemy civilians.66 Holding military uses of force
accountable to the law of war is not interfering in a political question nor
engaging in a judicial practice for which the American judiciary lacks
competence. As we have seen, U.S. courts have for more than two centuries
held the U.S. military accountable to the law of war.
Koohi v. United States is a recent example of federal courts rejecting
political question objections and reviewing U.S. military activity. On the
question of the justiciability of the U.S. Navy wrongfully firing upon an Iranian
civilian aircraft and killing all 290 people aboard, the Ninth Circuit found that
"the fact that the plaintiffs' lawsuit involves the operation of a United States
warship does not render it beyond judicial cognizance."67 The court went on to
find that the lawsuit was not "judicially unmanageable because the challenged
conduct took place as part of an authorized military operation. The Supreme
Court has made clear that the federal courts are capable of reviewing military
decisions, particularly when those decisions cause injury to civilians." 68
Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately dismissed the claim in Koohi on
sovereign immunity grounds, it belongs to an important line of cases, including
65. Cf Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619-20 (1912) (citing Little v. Barreme, 6
U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804)) ("The exemption of the United States from suit does not protect its officers
from personal liability to persons whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded."). Goltra v.
Weeks, 271 U.S. 536, 545 (1926), quotes the passage from Philadelphia Co. in its entirety. See also
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896) (citing Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170; Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204
(1877)) ("[T]he exemption of the United States from judicial process does not protect their officers and
agents, civil or military, in time of peace, from being personally liable to an action of tort by a private
person whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded or injured, even by authority of the
United States.").
66. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 12, art. 48.
67. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
United Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 181-82 (1976) (holding that a suit alleging that a naval vessel
negligently collided with a merchant ship may be brought against the United States if it satisfies the
reciprocity requirements of the Public Vessels Act); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379,
392-95 (9th Cir. 1964) (allowing suit for aeronautic disaster arising from negligence during military
training mission).
68. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1331. The court referred to The Paquete Habana as "the controlling
case." Id.
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Ramirez de Arellano, the detention cases,69 and the recent AI-Aulaqi case,70 in
which courts have not found political questions when asked to review military
uses of force.
Of all the cases in the last decade that have been dismissed on political
question grounds,71 El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States
provides the most instructive discussion of why these cases fail to reach the
merits. There, Judge Griffith found that "courts cannot reconsider the wisdom
of discretionary foreign policy decisions" and accordingly dismissed the case.
72
As Griffith rightfully pointed out, "Whether an attack on a foreign target is
justified-that is whether it is warranted or well-grounded-is a quintessential
policy choice and value determination constitutionally committed for resolution
to the halls of Congress or the confimes of the Executive Branch.,73 Griffith
went on to explain that "the presence of a political question in these cases turns
not on the nature of the government conduct under review but more precisely
on the question the plaintiff raises about the challenged action."74 In El-Shifa,
"the plaintiffs' law-of-nations claim falls squarely within this prohibition
because it would require [the court] to declare that the bombing of the EI-Shifa
plant was 'mistaken and not justified.' 75 Judge Griffith made perfectly
explicit that the plaintiffs might have had a legitimate legal claim, but they
simply failed to raise a proper legal question. Judge Griffith thus indicated that
U.S. military action is perfectly open to challenge. However, in order to raise a
legal challenge in court, a plaintiff cannot present the issue as a policy question
or invoke only vaguely applicable law. Successfully challenging U.S. military
activity depends on raising the appropriate legal questions.
In contrast to the types of claims that raise political questions, reviewing
the legality of drone strikes according to the deeply entrenched laws of
distinction and proportionality both gives the court substantive law to apply and
asks only whether the government action in question satisfied or violated the
law. The threshold question is not whether the President is justified in his
decisions to defend the nation as Commander-in-Chief. Rather, the question is
whether, in carrying out the drone strike, the commander of the strike satisfied
the laws of distinction and proportionality. That is, the question is not whether
targeting the enemy was justified, but whether the targeting was carried out in a
legal manner. A military commander who fails to satisfy distinction and
proportionality will have conducted an unlawful strike even if he had authority
to order a strike. If military commanders are not free to abandon the law of war
in conducting drone strikes, courts should reach the merits of a well-pled
complaint alleging violation of the law of war.
69. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723; Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507.
70. At-Aulaqi 11, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 56 ("The Court concludes that the political question
doctrine does not bar its review of Plaintiffs' Complaint.").
71. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 559 F.3d 578, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2009), aff'd,
607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
72. El-Shifa Pharmn. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
73. Id. at 844-45 (internal quotations omitted).
74. Id. at 842 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 844.
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IV. REACHING THE MERITS OF DRONE STRIKES
Stepping back from the separation of powers and national security
reasons for ex post judicial review of drone strikes, it is clear that any case the
judiciary ultimately reviews will have to start with a well-formed complaint by
a plaintiff with standing. Until now, the only actions seeking judicial review of
drone strikes have been brought by American citizens seeking injunctive relief
and damages for alleged constitutional violations.76 Both Al-Aulaqi cases
failed to reach the merits on procedural and justiciability grounds. As the
discussion of the political question doctrine demonstrates, the main failing,
common to both recent drone cases, is that plaintiffs failed to identify with any
precision an applicable federal law that limits the executive's actions in war
and which the court could apply to determine the legality of the strike. Because
the courts were not presented with clearly applicable federal law against which
the executive's actions could be adjudicated, the judges found the uncertain
application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the executive's use of lethal
military force raised political questions77 or, alternatively, that "special
factors' '78 counseled against extending a remedy in such cases. Even if the
approach taken in the Al-Aulaqi cases had been successful, well-settled
precedent suggests that courts would be unwilling to extend constitutional
protections to non-citizens outside of U.S. territory.79 Thus, the overwhelming
majority of civilians harmed by drone strikes would be unable to bring a case
on the same grounds. Although we have seen that our courts have a long
history of reviewing military uses of force for their compliance with the law of
war, any attempt to win judicial review of drone strikes today will have to
identify the correct law governing drone strikes and then overcome a host of
procedural and justiciability hurdles to reach the merits. This Part shows how
plaintiffs can do just that by first identifying the law actually governing drones
strikes and then showing how plaintiffs can clear each hurdle from jurisdiction
and cause of action to sovereign immunity and state secrets.
A. The Law of War Is the Correct Law To Apply to Drone Strikes
A successful case challenging the legality of a particular drone strike
must claim a violation of a federal law that actually governs the military's use
of force. While it remains unclear just how the Bill of Rights might govern
military targeting, the executive and the military have long acknowledged that
the law of war governs targeting. For instance, the United States Air Force
Doctrine Document, Targeting, states that "[tihe 'law of war' is a term
encompassing all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the
76. See Al-Aulaqi 11, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014); Al-Aulaqi 1, 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D. C.
2010).
77. Al Aulaqi I, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 46 ("[P]laintiff's claims pose precisely the types of
complex policy questions that the D.C. Circuit has historically held non-justiciable under the political
question doctrine.").
78. AI-Aulaqi I1, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 66 ("[T]he motion to dismiss will be granted because
special factors counsel hesitation in implying a Bivens remedy in these circumstances.").
79. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).
[Vol. 41:155
Due Process of War in the Age of Drones
United States including treaties and international agreements to which the
United States is a party, and applicable customary international aw."80 The
Air Force goes on to specify that "[t]argeting must adhere to the [law of war]"
which "rests on four fundamental principles that are inherent to all targeting
decisions," among which are "distinction" and "proportionality."81 Moreover,
Targeting defines the "Role of the Judge Advocate" to include "an affirmative
duty to provide legal advice to commanders and their staffs that is consistent
with the international and domestic legal obligations."82 Military lawyers are
required to make a legal evaluation of distinction and proportionality before
80. U.S. AIR FORCE, TARGETING, Air Force Doctrine Doe. 3-60, at 88 (June 8, 2006)
(emphasis added).
81. Id. The other two principles are military necessity and unnecessary suffering, or
"humanity." The Air Force also explains that "LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict]" and "law of war" are
synonymous. Id. ("The 'law of war' is also commonly referred to as the LOAC."). The law of
distinction specifies that "[piarties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall
direct their operations only against military objectives." Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 48; see
also id. arts. 44(3) ("In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack."), 48 ("In order to ensure respect
for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives."), 51(3)
("Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities."), 51(5)(a) ("[A]n attack by bombardment by any methods or means which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located
in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects
[shall be considered as indiscriminate]."), 52(2) ("Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage."), 57(2)(a)(ii) ("[T]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall ... take all feasible
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects."), and
57(3) ("When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military
advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the
least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects."). The law of proportionality prohibits attacks
"which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated." Id. arts. 51(4), 51(5)(b); see also Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] ("[S]erious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: Intentionally launching an attack in
the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental oss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.");
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, arts. 57(2)(a)(ii) ("[T]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall
take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and
in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects."), and 57(2)(b) ("[A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated."). The U.S. Navy manual defines proportionality as "a balancing test to determine if the
incidental injury, including death to civilians and damage to civilian objects, is excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained." DEP'T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 5.3.3 (2007).
82. U.S. AIR FORCE, supra note 80, at 95.
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any strike. While commanders may override the JAG's particular
recommendation, commanders are still bound to adhere to the laws of
distinction and proportionality for any strike they order.
What this means for judges who will review drone strikes for their
compliance with the law of war is that they will have a wealth of legal analyses
before them. Just as Israeli judges and judges at international tribunals have
adjudicated alleged violations of distinction and proportionality, U.S. judges
will adjudicate whether commanders reasonably adhere to the law.83 Where
commanders have fired only on military objects and reasonably calculated
military advantage to outweigh anticipated civilian casualties, the drone strike
should be found lawful. Such findings will reinforce the practice of
distinguishing military from civilian objects and calculating proportionality,
while contributing to much needed jurisprudence on the subject in the U.S.
Where, however, the requirements of distinction and proportionality have been
egregiously flouted, perhaps by firing at a civilian object or failing to consider
anticipated civilian casualties, the strike should be found unlawful. Such
findings, and the accompanying public, international, and security
repercussions,84 will serve to compel future compliance with the law of war
and deter disregard for the rights and legal protections of civilians in war. As
Federal courts have done throughout the last decade with respect to detention,
85
those same courts can apply the law of war to drone strikes to protect
fundamental rights and assure the legality and legitimacy of government
activity in war. The laws of distinction and proportionality as defined in
customary international law and explicitly embraced as binding on military
targeting are the appropriate federal law to apply when reviewing the legality of
86drone strikes. As I will now show, an action seeking declaratory judgment
83. The reasonableness tandard for compliance with the law of armed conflict is used by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which held in Gali that the appropriate
standard for assessing compliance with proportionality in armed conflict is "whether a reasonably well-
informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information
available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack."
Prosecutor v. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, 58 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Dec. 5, 2003); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946); HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm.
Against Torture v. Government [2006](2) lsrLR 459 (Isr.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice]Apr. 16, 2010, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 581, 2010 (Ger.).
84. On the problem of decreased intelligence cooperation, and thus decreased security due to
fears that drone strikes have been carried out in violation of the law of war, see Somaiya, supra note 3 1;
Stark, supra note 31.
85. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court analyzes international law of war at length to support the
proposition that while detention of enemy combatants is authorized for the duration of hostilities,
indefinite detention is not authorized. 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) ("It is a clearly established principle of
the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities."). In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Court analyzes the international law of war at length and concludes that the military commission that
was to try Hamdan was unlawful because it complied neither with the international law that the U.S. had
acceded to by treaty nor with customary international law that the U.S. had not ratified but nevertheless
came to accept as binding. 548 U.S. 557, 631-35 (2006) ("Common Article 3 obviously tolerates a great
degree of flexibility in trying individuals captured during armed conflict; its requirements are general
ones .... But requirements they are nonetheless. The commission that the President has convened to try
Hamdan does not meet those requirements."). For an extended discussion of U.S. courts' application of
the law of war to detention cases, see Oona Hathaway et al., The Power To Detain: Detention of
Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 123, 153-61 (2013).
86. For the proposition that customary international law is federal law, see The Paquete
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brought by a victim of a drone strike carried out in violation of distinction or
proportionality should be granted a merits review in U.S. federal court.
B. Courts have Jurisdiction under Sections 1331 and 1350
Federal Courts should recognize that they have jurisdiction to review the
legality of drone strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1350. Section 1331
grants federal district courts jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."87 As we have seen, the
laws of distinction and proportionality are central elements of the law of war
that the U.S. has affirmed as binding on its military operations. As legally
binding customary international law, distinction and proportionality form part
of our federal law and the violation of these principles raises a federal• 88
question. Federal district courts thus have jurisdiction to review drone strikes
for their compliance with the laws of distinction and proportionality.
For all cases brought by foreign nationals, federal question jurisdiction
can be complemented by the jurisdiction granted by section 1350, commonly
referred to as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Section 1350 grants district courts
"original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."89 As central
pillars of the law of war and ratified treaty obligations of 174 countries,
90
distinction and proportionality are core instances of the law of nations today.
Federal district courts should thus find that they have jurisdiction over tort
cases brought by foreign nationals harmed by unlawful drone strikes.
C. Violations of Distinction and Proportionality Provide a Cause of
Action
Although federal question and ATS jurisdiction for judicial review of
drone strikes is relatively straightforward, the holdings in Sosa and Kiobel and
some judicial interpretations of the law of war make claiming a private cause of
action for violations of distinction or proportionality the greatest legal
challenge for plaintiffs. For cases brought solely under federal question
jurisdiction, judges should find a direct cause of action for a violation of
distinction or proportionality. Although some judges have argued that the law
of war does not grant a private cause of action for individuals,91 as we have
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Harold Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, I ll
HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1839 (1998).
87. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (2012).
88. Id.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
90. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12. For a list of States Parties to Additional Protocol
1, see Treaties andStates Parties to Such Treaties, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSs, https://www.icrc
.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp viewStates=XPages-NORMStatesParties&xp-treatySelected=470
(last visited Nov. 13, 2015). As demonstrated by the U.S. Air Force Doctrine Document, Targeting,
although the U.S. is not a state party to Additional Protocol 1, it nevertheless considers distinction and
proportionality to be binding customary international law. U.S. AIR FORCE, supra note 80, at 88.
91. Judge Bork famously argued, on essentially political question grounds, that survivors and
the estates of persons attacked on a bus in Israel had no private cause of action under the law of nations.
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seen, federal courts have consistently adjudicated individual claims against the
United States for violations of the law of war. As we saw in Little, The Prize
Cases, and The Paquette Habana, the Court directly applied the law of war to
government action to review its legality. More recently, in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the Court adjudicated the claim that Hamdan's rights under the law
of war had been violated by the improperly constituted military commission in
which he was tried.92 In Al-Bihani v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit adjudicated Al-
Bihani's claim that the international law of co-belligerency made his detention
unlawful.93 Federal court adjudications of law of war claims show that they
confer a cause of action on individuals harmed by unlawful military activity.
As the Court found in Laird v. Tatum, "when presented with claims of
judicially cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion into the civilian
sector, federal courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those asserting
such injury.
' 94
Despite the central position of distinction and proportionality in
international law, any case claiming ATS jurisdiction will likely be challenged
by the limitations recently imposed by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrole. Co. In Sosa, the Court limited the
law of nations violations actionable under section 1350 to those with no "less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.,95 In Kiobel, the Court limited
the territorial reach of section 1350 to "claims [that] touch and concern the
territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application."96 Strikes that harm civilians
in violation of the law of war satisfy the criteria set out in Sosa and Kiobel for
three fundamental reasons: (i) because distinction and proportionality are
universally recognized norms placing definite limitations on war; (ii) because
violations committed by the U.S. military directly touch and concern the United
States; and (iii) because recognizing a cause of action for such violations in
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Neither the law of nations
nor any of the relevant treaties provides a cause of action that appellants may assert in courts of the
United States. Furthermore, we should not, in an area such as this, infer a cause of action not explicitly
given. In reaching this latter conclusion, I am guided chiefly by separation of powers principles, which
caution courts to avoid potential interference with the political branches' conduct of foreign relations.").
92. 548 U.S. 557, 628 (2006) ("[R]egardless of the nature of the fights conferred on Hamdan,
they are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the law of war. And compliance with the law of
war is the condition upon which the authority [to convene a military commission] is granted." (internal
citations omitted)).
93. 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (A1-Bihani argues that "the international laws of co-
belligerency . . . demonstrate that the [fifty-fifth Arab Brigade] should have been allowed the
opportunity to remain neutral upon notice of a conflict between the United States and the Taliban.").
Similarly, D.C. Circuit and district courts adjudicated the claim that the law of war does not recognize
material support as a triable offense. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir.
2012) ("[T]he issue here is whether material support for terrorism is an international-law war crime.
The answer is no .... There is no international-law proscription of material support for terrorism.");
Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 76 (D.D.C. 2009) ("[d]etaining an individual who 'substantially
supports' . . . an organization [engaged in hostilities against the U.S.], but is not part of it, is simply not
authorized by the AUMF itself or by the law of war.").
94. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972).
95. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
96. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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U.S. courts would not impose U.S. law on territory controlled by foreign
sovereigns or interfere with foreign policy choices of the political branches.
Recognizing a cause of action under section 1350 would reinforce the U.S.
commitment to the rule of law, provide relief for clear violations of distinction
or proportionality, and provide legal vindication for the drone program as a
whole, both for the American public and our allies abroad.
Before delving into the legal arguments for why drone strikes in violation
of the law of war satisfy the criteria set out in Sosa and Kiobel, it is worth
recognizing that the facts of both cases lie at extreme ends of the spectrum of
cases that might be brought under the ATS. The so-called "foreign cubed
' 97
fact pattern of Kiobel, which involved a foreign plaintiff, a foreign corporate
defendant, and an alleged violation taking place wholly within the territory of a
foreign sovereign, is significantly unlike drone strikes carried out by the U.S.
military in territory that typically lacks foreign sovereign control. The facts of
Sosa, whose ATS claim was also foreign cubed, involved an alleged illegal
detention for a single day that was held not to constitute a clear violation of the
law of nations. That is, the norm in question lacked the requisite international
acceptance, and the violation was found to be both slight and remediable
insofar as Alvarez-Machain was transferred to the custody of "lawful
authorities" for "prompt arraignment" in less than twenty-four hours.98 By
contrast, the facts of unlawful drone strikes involve permanent harm of the
greatest magnitude, usually in the form of wrongful death, severe disabling
injury, or extensive property damage. Moreover, insofar as the harm arises due
to violations of distinction or proportionality, norms of an indisputably
international character are invoked.
Violations of distinction and proportionality meet the high legal bar
established in Sosa because they are universally accepted norms that place
definite limits on military conduct. As the Sosa Court held, "courts should
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the eighteenth-century paradigms we
have recognized."99 Distinction and proportionality are precisely norms of
such specificity and international recognition. As noted above, they have been
ratified as treaty obligations by 174 nationsl °° and recognized as binding
customary international law by non-ratifying states, including the United States
and Israel.101 As we have also seen, Air Force JAGs have an affirmative duty
97. See Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to "Foreign Squared"
Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel
-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases.
98. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738.
99. Id. at 725; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) ("It is only
where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several,
concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an
international law violation within the meaning of the statute.").
100. Additional Protocol I, supra note 12.
101. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of lsr. [2006](2) lsrLR
459 (lsr.); U.S. AIR FORCE, supra note 80, at 88.
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to apply distinction and proportionality to every contemplated strike.,°2 Ex post
judicial review of drone strikes would thus entail reviewing strikes for their
compliance with these well-established universal norms. Courts should have an
interest in adjudicating cases that appear to bring clear or egregious violations
of these universal norms, such as reported strikes on wedding caravans or
outdoor cafds where significant numbers of civilians have been killed.
Statements by top U.S. officials 0 3 and the military itself demonstrate that
wanton disregard for the requirements of distinction and proportionality would
constitute a universally recognized violation of the law of nations.'°4
In addition to the requirements of definite content and universal
acceptance, the Kiobel court held that the ATS should be applied only where
"claims touch and concern the territory of the United States ... with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application."'1 5 All of
the drone strikes in question do indeed take place on foreign soil. However,
unlike the Kiobel defendant, Royal Dutch Petroleum, which had a "mere
corporate presence' °6 in the United States, drone strikes are carried out solely
by U.S. officials, who themselves derive their power from and are bound by
U.S. law. °7 Given direct U.S. military involvement, these cases fundamentally
"touch and concern" the United States.
At least two early Opinions of the Attorney General buttress the view that
harm committed against foreign nationals by U.S. citizens abroad sufficiently
touches and concerns the United States. As the Sosa Court itself noted, in 1795,
Attorney General William Bradford "was asked whether criminal prosecution
was available against Americans who had taken part in the French plunder of a
British slave colony in Sierra Leone."'0 8 Although Bradford was uncertain
about the availability of criminal prosecution, "he made it clear that a federal
court was open for the prosecution of a tort action growing out of the
episode."1°9 Bradford argued that stated:
[T]here can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by
these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States;
jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for
102. U.S. AIR FORCE, supra note 80, at 95.
103. See, e.g., John 0. Brennan, Ass't to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism,
Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.: The Ethics and
Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
in Washington, D.C.: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010).
104. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 137-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2005),
ajfd sub nom. Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.
2008); HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in lsr. v. Gov't of lsr. [2006](2) lsrLR 459 (lsr.);
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
105. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
106. Id.
107. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) ("The United States is entirely a creature of the
Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the
limitations imposed by the Constitution.").
108. 542 U.S. 692, 721 (2004).
109. Id.
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a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States ....
The Sosa Court went on to conclude, "[I]t appears likely that Bradford
understood the ATS to provide jurisdiction over what must have amounted to
common law causes of action."11I A little more than a century later, Bradford's
view was confirmed by one of his successors, Attorney General Charles J.
Bonaparte. In 1907, when asked what legal remedies might be available for
Mexican citizens harmed by the actions of an American irrigation company
along the Rio Grande River, Bonaparte replied that the ATS "provide[s] a
forum and a right of action.' ' 12 Bonaparte added that the success of such suits
should "be determined by judicial decision."'1 3 Bonaparte made explicit that
courts should recognize a cause of action under the ATS when Americans
violate "the principles of international law" and harm foreign nationals
abroad.114 These opinions add further credibility to the position that torts in
violation of substantive and universally accepted principles of international law
sufficiently "touch and concern" the United States when they are committed by
Americans abroad.
The Kiobel Court articulated two further concerns with the extraterritorial
application of the ATS. The Court first explained that its "presumption [against
extraterritorial application] 'serves to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord."1 "5 This concern that a clash of laws might sow international discord
simply does not apply to drone strikes 116 because strikes are governed by the
international law of war that applies equally to the United States and other
nations. Moreover, the geographic areas in which drone strikes are typically
carried out are either war zones where sovereignty is in question or, more
commonly, in zones where the local de jure sovereign does not maintain de
facto control. 117 These areas are more akin to the high seas and thus analogous
to the pirate cases that were "beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States or any other country.""18 The United States typically justifies drone
strikes in Pakistan or Yemen as acts of self-defense carried out in territory
110. Id. (citing I Op. Att'y Gen. 59 (1795)).
111. Id. at 720. It is worth noting that the Sosa Court also cites two early foreign cubed cases in
which ATS jurisdiction would have been recognized for an action for a tort only. Id. (citing Bolchos v.
Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D.Pa.1793) (No.
9,895)).
112. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 780 (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing 26
Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (citing EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
116. The employment and securities regulation issues raised in the Aramco and National
Australian Bank cases cited in Kiobel concern domestic, rather than international, law. See, e.g.,
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010) ("Like the United States, foreign countries
regulate their domestic securities exchanges and securities transactions occurring within their territorial
jurisdiction. And the regulation of other countries often differs from ours as to what constitutes fraud,
what disclosures must be made .... ").
117. The Supreme Court specifically rejected the government's argument in Boumediene "that
dejure sovereignty is the touchstone of habeas corpus jurisdiction." 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008).
118. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
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where the nominal sovereign is unable or unwilling "to suppress the threat."19
Because the de jure sovereign in the remote or "tribal" territories in question
does not maintain de facto jurisdictional control, there is no sense in which
recognizing a cause of action for Pakistani or Yemeni civilian plaintiffs harmed
by drone strikes in clear violation of the law of war would be imposing "the
sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial
jurisdiction of another sovereign." 120 In fact, given the principle of foreign
sovereign immunity, recognizing a cause of action in federal courts is the only
hope for any form of relief for foreign civilians harmed by strikes in violation
of the law of war.
In addition to worries about comity and international discord, the Kiobel
court was concerned to avoid "impinging on the discretion of the Legislative
and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs."'121 The Court explained
that "[t]he presumption against extraterritorial application helps ensure that the
Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries
foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches."'
122
While it is true that judicial decisions about law of war violations might carry
foreign policy consequences by determining the legality or illegality of
executive action abroad, the judiciary would be acting in a wholly appropriate
role. Determining whether there has been wanton disregard for the limits that
the United States itself recognizes as bearing on warfare is a quintessential
legal task. In fact, as the Court explained in Sosa, the ATS provides "a judicial
remedy" precisely for violations of the law of nations that "threaten[] serious
consequences in international affairs."'123 In the case of drone strikes that
egregiously violate the law of war, there is no risk of "adverse foreign policy
consequences" that might follow "our courts ... sit[ting] in judgment of the
conduct of foreign officials in their own countries with respect to their own
citizens."'' 24 On the contrary, these cases entail only the indisputable function
of the judiciary to pronounce on the legality or illegality of U.S. government
action in an actual case or controversy.
Given the universal recognition of distinction and proportionality as
definite limitations on war, the direct contact and concern of drone strikes for
the U.S. territory, and lack of comity or foreign policy impropriety, courts
should recognize a cause of action for aliens harmed by unlawful U.S. drone
strikes abroad. Doing so would conform with the prevailing view, initially set
out by Judge Edwards' analysis in Tel-Oren, that the ATS recognizes a cause of
action where there has been a violation of a clearly defined law of nations.'
25
This understanding of the ATS was ratified in the Torture Victim Protection
119. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S.
CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 2 (2011).
120. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
121. Id. at 1664 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)).
122. Id.
123. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
124. Id. at 728 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J.,
concurring)).
125. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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Act (TVPA) of 1991 and its accompanying documents. The House Report on
the TVPA explicitly states that section 1350 "should remain intact to permit
suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into the
rules of customary international law."1 26 As we have seen, the view expressed
by the House also has a rich executive branch heritage dating back to Attorneys
General Branford and Bonaparte. The overwhelming ratification of distinction
and proportionality leaves no serious doubt that they are core elements of the
law of nations. Given the universal recognition of the laws of distinction and
proportionality, courts should find that their violation grants a cause of action
to victims of unlawful drone strikes.
D. Victims of Drone Strikes Have Standing
Lack of standing has plagued some attempts to bring a case challenging
governmental deprivations. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, "To establish Article III standing, an injury must
be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling."' 27 The plaintiffs in
Clapper and Al-Aulaqi were ultimately found to lack standing because they
could prove neither that a harm had been committed nor the sufficient
likelihood of a future harm. In contrast to these plaintiffs, victims of drone
strikes have suffered a direct and demonstrable deprivation that can be directly
traced to government action, and which can be redressed by a ruling that the
deprivation was unlawful. As long as the case is brought by someone who has
suffered a direct deprivation, courts should find that she satisfies the case or
controversy requirement and thus has standing.128
E. Declaratory Relief Circumvents Sovereign Immunity
Having established jurisdiction, a cause of action, and standing, a plaintiff
bringing suit as the victim of an unlawful drone strike will find sovereign
immunity an almost insurmountable obstacle. As the Supreme Court stated in
United States v. Sherwood, "It is elementary that the United States, as
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . , and the
terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to
entertain the suit."'29 U.S. courts thus have no jurisdiction over cases brought
against the United States in the absence of an explicit waiver of sovereign
immunity.130 Although the Ninth Circuit found in Koohi that the case raised a
126. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (emphasis added).
127. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (internal quotations omitted).
128. Those bringing a wrongful death claim on behalf of the estate of deceased victims of
unlawful strikes should also have standing. This view of standing is confirmed by the fact that the
government did not raise, and Judge Collyer did not note, any standing issues with the estates of the
victims bringing suit in Al-Aulaqi I. See 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014).
129. 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cf United States v. Mitchell,
445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) ("In the absence of clear congressional consent, then, there is no jurisdiction in
the Court of Claims more than in any other court to entertain suits against the United States." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
130. Cf United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) ("A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot
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justiciable question, the court ultimately dismissed the case on the grounds that
sovereign immunity prevented the government from being sued for damages.
The court found that "the FTCA [Federal Tort Claims Act] contains an explicit
exception for 'any claim arising out of combatant activities of the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war."" 31 While Congress
could amend the FTCA to remove the exception for military activities in war or
pass legislation expressly waiving sovereign immunity for drone strikes carried
out in clear violation of the law of war, 132 damages relief is not available to
victims of drone strikes at present.
The most common alternative to damages relief is the equitable relief of
an injunction. As was recently demonstrated in Clapper, however, injunctive
relief is plagued by the difficulty in presenting a convincing case that the harm
in question is likely to be repeated in the future. For victims of drone strikes,
particularly those who are deceased, there is virtually no hope of presenting the
requisite likelihood of a repeated or future threat.133 Thus injunctive relief, like
damages relief, will be unavailable to victims of unlawful drone strikes.
Thankfully Congress had the wisdom to provide a third alternative in the
1934 Declaratory Judgment Act. Now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the
Declaratory Judgment Act provides, "In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction, ... any court of the United States ... may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought."'134 While the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the Declaratory Judgment Act "created an opportunity, rather
than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants,"'135 it has also
emphasized that courts have good reason to grant declaratory relief in cases that
raise federal questions and for which there are no other remedies.136 Victims of
allegedly illegal drone strikes present precisely such a case. Moreover,
declaratory relief will serve a variety of legal and dignitary goals. A
clarification of the legal status of victim's deaths will put their families or their
estates in a position to know whether any further legal remedy may be
available. The families or estates of victims, of drones strikes found to be
carried out in violation of the law will also have the relief of knowing that their
deaths were not justified or carried out legally. The very act of reviewing their
deaths for their legality will show families that there is no right to treat their
lives and deaths as unreviewable mistakes. The recognition and respect of
formal legal proceedings and judgment will bring dignified closure to the
be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992).
132. A third possibility would be amending the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) to
include extra-judicial killing carried out by American officials. Presently, section 2(a) of the TVPA
expressly limits liability to "[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation." H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 1 (1992) (emphasis added).
133. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
135. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995); see also Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah
v. Wycoff Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952) ("The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 ... is an
enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.").
136. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290.
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victims' wrongful deaths.
From the perspective of those motivated to bring a case that actually
reaches the merits, declaratory relief has the further virtue of enabling judgment
against the U.S. government and military commanders by qualifying for a
waiver of sovereign immunity. Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action ... is entitled to judicial
review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than
money damages . . . shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the
ground that it is qgainst the United States or that the United States is an
indispensable party.
Section 702 opens the door to plaintiffs seeking declaratory judgment
against military officials for alleged violations of the law of war because it does
not involve "money damages."'138 Moreover, because drone strikes are ordered
far from the field of battle, they are not subject to section 701(b)(1)(G) of the
APA, which excepts judicial review for "military authority exercised in the
field in time of war or in occupied territory.'' 139 Courts should find strong
reason to grant victims of drone strikes declaratory relief since, to paraphrase
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens, for victims of drone strikes, it is
declaratory relief or nothing.140
F. State Secrets Are Not Jeopardized by Judicial Review
Assuming that plaintiffs clear the procedural and justiciability hurdles
discussed thus far, they will most likely have to confront the final hurdle of the
state secrets privilege. As the Supreme Court recognized over a century ago in
Totten v. United States, "in exceptional circumstances courts must act in the
interest of the country's national security to prevent disclosure of state secrets,
even to the point of dismissing a case entirely."' 41 Indeed, in the recent Al-
Aulaqi v. Panetta case, the government argued that Aulaqi's complaint should
be dismissed because "plaintiffs' allegations 'would inevitably require an
inquiry into classified information that may undermine ongoing covert
operations.""42 Thankfully Judge Collyer found this to be a losing claim,
137. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (emphasis added).
138. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit recognized in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan that "ATS suits
seeking non-monetary relief may proceed against the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the CIA
under the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity." Al-Aulaqi 1, 727 F. Supp. 2d I, 41 (D.D.C. 2010)
(describing Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
139. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l)(G) (2012).
140. Speaking about desirability of a direct suit against the government for harm incurred by
the action of government officials, Justice Harlan noted that "[h]owever desirable a direct remedy
against the Government might be as a substitute for individual official liability, the sovereign still
remains immune to suit .... For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing." Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
141. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876)).
142. Defendants' Motion To Dismiss 12, At-Aulaqi 11, 35 F.Supp.3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014) (No.
l:12-cv-0 1192 (RMC)) (citing Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). While the motion
argues for dismissal on the basis of "special factors," it notes that "[t]he United States, which is not a
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ultimately rebuking the United States for its "truculent opposition" to her order
to release classified information.143 Given the recent statements by Secretary of
Homeland Security Jeh Johnson about our courts' ability to handle classified
information, we should not expect invocations of the state secrets privilege to
win much credibility with courts today.
In a discussion of possible drone courts, Johnson admitted that "Article
III judges can receive highly sensitive classified information ex parte; in
Washington, D.C., the infrastructure for doing this already exists."' 144 Indeed,
in Boumediene, Judge Leon of the D.C. District Court ultimately ruled in favor
of Boumediene's release at least in part on the basis of in camera review of the
government's case against Boumediene.145 In fact, as Judge Graber of the
Ninth Circuit has demonstrated, the infrastructure for dealing with classified
information is not limited only to the D.C. courts. Judge Graber has herself
recommended both in camera review and security clearances for defense
attorneys.146 Many judges in and around the D.C. Circuit also require their law
clerks to obtain security clearances in anticipation of handling classified
information. Our federal courts' demonstrated ability to deal with classified
information is yet another indication of their competence to review drone
strikes, and do so without sacrificing state secrets or national security. Given
our courts' ability to review classified information, the state secrets privilege
should not prevent courts from reaching the merits of cases brought by victims
of allegedly unlawful drone strikes.
The above discussion shows that courts can and should reach the merits
of a case brought by a civilian victim seeking a declaration of the unlawfulness
of the drone strike that injured him. Having looked at the issue solely from the
side of how a victim might successfully bring a case, I can now add that the
government also has a real interest in such cases reaching the merits. Apart
from the relief granted to individual victims of strikes, declaratory judgment
will have the further effect of either vindicating the lawfulness and legitimacy
of U.S. drone strikes where they are found to be legal, or compelling internal
reform where specific strikes are found to be carried out unlawfully. If the
President and military are truly interested in convincing the American people
and our allies of the legality and legitimacy of the drone program, they should
want to demonstrate the lawfulness of specific strikes that harm civilians in
federal court. A failure to vindicate the drone program in court will lead to
greater U.S. isolation and thus greater insecurity.147 Given the value of
party to this suit, has filed a statement of interest and has reserved its right to invoke the state secrets
privilege in the event this case proceeds beyond the motion-to-dismiss stage." Id. at 15-16. The motion
also argues that Aulaqi's complaint should be dismissed because it raises non-justiciable political
questions. Id. at 27.
143. AI-AulaqiIl, 35F. Supp. 3dat81.
144. Johnson, supra note 4.
145. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Bensayah
v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
146. Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Treas., 686 F.3d 965, 982-84 (9th Cir.
2012).
147. See Somaiya, supra note 31; Stark, supra note 31.
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intelligence cooperation in counter-terrorism, demonstrating the lawfulness of
drone strikes should be a national security priority.
V. DUE PROCESS OF WAR IN PRACTICE
Given that I have argued throughout for ex post judicial review of drone
strikes, it is reasonable to expect some illustration of just how courts can review
strikes for their compliance with distinction and proportionality.148 Before
looking at an actual example, we should familiarize ourselves with the ground
rules. First, in assessing compliance with distinction and proportionality, courts
are assessing the legal evaluation of commanders for their reasonableness.1
49
Courts should thus focus their review on the legal analysis and
recommendation given by JAGs and adopted by commanders, particularly
where commanders overrule JAG legal assessments. Given the pre-planned
nature of drone strikes and the relative calm and security from which they are
carried out, judges can anticipate a relatively robust JAG legal analysis for their
review.
As for specific judicial tests, courts should look to the basic principles of
distinction and proportionality as defined in the law of war. Most
fundamentally, distinction requires that "[p]arties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives." 150 With respect to persons
targeted, the law of distinction expressly exempts civilians from attack and the
"dangers arising from military operations." 151 Distinction defines civilian
objects negatively as all those objects that are not military. 152 In turn, military
objects are defined as "those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
148. While a comprehensive discussion of the law of war bearing on drone strikes is beyond the
scope of this article, the proper approach to military advantage and proportionality in the targeted killing
context is described in Joshua Andresen, New Voices, Challenging the Perplexity over Jus in Bello
Proportionality, 7 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2014).
149. See Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, 58 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
150. Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 48; see also id. arts. 44(3) ("In order to promote
the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military
operation preparatory to an attack."), 51(3) ("Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this
Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."), 52(2) ("Attacks shall be
limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage."), 57(3) ("When a choice is possible between several military
objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack
on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.").
151. Id. art. 51(1). The only exception is that civilians may be targeted "for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities." Id. art. 51(3). Since the drone strikes in question are pre-planned attacks
on known militants and generally carried out away from hot battlefields, we can expect that the
exception for targeting civilians taking a direct part in hostilities will rarely be invoked.
152. Id. art. 52(1) ("Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian
objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2 [of Article 52 in the
Additional Protocol I].").
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destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage." 153 As we know, drone strikes are
frequently carried out against targets that strain a strict civilian-military object
distinction. The law of distinction anticipates the problem posed by "dual-use"
objects that have both a civilian and a military function and counsels that "[i]n
case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is
being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be
presumed not o be so used."'154 In the typical drone strike against an enemy
combatant, the combatant himself will be a lawful target. The lawfulness of
targeting the enemy combatant may, however, be negated if, in order to target
the combatant, a civilian object, such as a wedding caravan or an outdoor cafd
that is not making any effective contribution to military action, is targeted for
the drone strike. In other words, distinction requires a functional analysis of the
target object in question. Where part of a radio station, for example, has been
taken over as a militant command center, it would qualify as a proper military
object and satisfy distinction. Where, however, a single militant happens to be
present at a hospital, school, market, cafd, or apartment building that continues
to function in its ordinary civilian capacity and serve its normal civilian
function, the object retains its civilian character and should not be targeted.
In addition to the rules of distinction, courts should review a strike's
compliance with proportionality. The rule of proportionality in attack becomes
applicable whenever the legitimate targeting of a military person or object can
be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian property. In such cases,
proportionality prohibits attacks "which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated."'155 Proportionality applies only to the
anticipated harm and anticipated military advantage, and holds commanders to
a reasonable assessment of these criteria.156 If we assume that drone strikes are
carried out in self-defense to avert terrorist attacks and save American civilian
and soldier lives, then the military advantage of the strike will involve a
reasonable assessment of the magnitude of the threat posed by the intended
target and the advantage of eliminating it. 157 The magnitude of the threat can
then be compared with the harm anticipated to accrue to civilians and civilian
objects as a result of the proposed strike. Here the test is a balancing one where
strikes will fail when harm to civilians and civilian objects is excessive in
153. Id. art. 52(2).
154. Id. art. 52(3).
155. Id. arts. 51(4), 51(5)(b); see also Rome Statute, supra note 81, art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Additional
Protocol I, supra note 12, arts. 57(2)(a)(ii), 57(2)(b).
156. On the importance of focusing on anticipated rather than actual results, see Michael
Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate
Balance, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 795, 825 (2010) ("[T]he legal question is the relationship between expected
harm and anticipated advantage in the operation as planned, not that which eventuated.").
157. For a more detailed argument that military advantage must be adjusted for likelihood of
success and uniqueness of opportunity see Andresen, supra note 148, at 31-32.
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relation to the anticipated military advantage. There will be easy cases at both
ends of the spectrum. Clearly passing cases will be those where anticipated
military advantage is great and anticipated harm very small. Clearly failing
cases will be those where anticipated military advantage is small or negligible
and anticipated harm significant. As for the "close calls" in the middle, courts
and judges should be heartened by three realizations: (1) that JAGs make these
calls every day and courts will be able to follow and review their legal
analyses; (2) that the test is for excessiveness, which means close cases tip in
favor of the reasonable commander; and (3) that proportionality tests are
common in a wide variety of civil litigation today. As the Eastern District of
New York recently found in the Agent Orange case, "American courts are fully
capable of applying the proportionality concept in civil litigations as
demonstrated by their handling of comparative negligence, proximate cause
and other sophisticated doctrines."
'1 58
Given an overview of the rules and principles governing distinction and
proportionality, we can now examine a concrete case. Returning to the first
scenario sketched at the beginning of this Note, we can illustrate how it holds
up against judicial review. In that scenario, a wedding party traveling along a
remote road in the high desert of Yemen is struck by drones, killing twelve
civilians and five suspected militants.159 Before we can assess whether this
strike reasonably complied with distinction and proportionality we must know
what the military commander-in-charge anticipated. Let us start with a
relatively easy scenario. If the commander reasonably believed, for example,
on the basis of an intelligence source that had proven reliable in the past, that
the wedding caravan was in fact a military convoy containing only enemy
combatants, then he would have fired at what he took to be a legitimate military
object with little or no anticipated civilian harm. In such a scenario, despite
what may be a terribly unfortunate result, the commander would have complied
completely with distinction and proportionality.
Moving to a more difficult, and perhaps more realistic, scenario, let us
imagine that the commander anticipated the events more or less as they
occurred. The commander received reliable intelligence that five enemy
militants would be traveling as part of a wedding party between two villages in
a remote area of Yemen. The militants were not attempting to disguise or
smuggle themselves. They were, in fact, taking part in the wedding procession
alongside family and friends. Although the wedding procession was composed
of at least fifty civilians, the commander had reliable intelligence that the
procession presented a rare opportunity to target the militants and that they
would be located in the last three vehicles in the procession, which would
158. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 137-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), affid
sub nom. Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
Although the Eastern District of New York declined to recognize a cause of action for the United
States's allegedly excessive use of the "Agent Orange" herbicide in Vietnam more than forty years
earlier, the easily distinguishable facts of drone strikes present much more straightforward cases for
application of distinction and proportionality by our federal courts today.
159. For the purpose of this discussion, I am assuming that all jus ad helium requirements are
met and will focus solely on jus in bello distinction and proportionality.
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contain approximately twelve civilians in addition to the militants. Although
the commander believed the intelligence was reliable, he was experienced
enough to know that these militants often change their plans or leak bad
intelligence to hinder detection of their location. Adjusting for the probable
accuracy of the intelligence, the commander concludes that if he targets the
final three vehicles of the procession, he can reasonably anticipate killing two
or three of the militants and somewhere between twelve and twenty civilians.
Erring on the side of caution, he anticipates killing two militants and twenty
civilians. He gives this information to his JAG and asks, can I order the strike?
The JAG immediately runs up against a challenging distinction analysis.
The militants are clear lawful targets. However, the wedding procession is a
clear civilian object that does not appear to be "used to make an effective
contribution to military action."'60 If the militants were concealing themselves
in the procession in order to carry out an attack, it might be a different story.
However, on the information known, there is no credible claim that the
wedding procession was being used for a military purpose. The JAG thus
concludes that the strike would violate distinction. While that is enough to
answer his commander in the negative, he knows that the commander will want
an analysis of proportionality as well. The JAG knows that these militants have
confirmed involvement in planned attacks that would have killed hundreds of
civilians if they were not thwarted at the last second. He also knows that the
militants are continuing to plan and order attacks that have the potential to kill
hundreds of civilians in the future. Reasoning that if the militants are not
stopped they will eventually succeed in one of their plots and kill hundreds of
civilians, the JAG concludes that even if twenty civilians are killed and only
two militants are killed, 161 the military advantage still exceeds the anticipated
harm by a significant margin. He thus reports to his commanding officer that he
should not order the strike because, even though the strike would be
proportionate, distinction prohibits the strike. The wedding procession is a
civilian object not making any "effective contribution to military action."
The commander does not like this answer. He believes the procession is
making an effective contribution to military action by shielding the militants
from what would otherwise be a lawful strike. He believes that enemy militants
should not be able to take advantage of "human shields." The JAG is
sympathetic with the commander's frustration, but reminds him that this is
simply not a lawful target and, anyway, we do not want to set an example for
strikes that we would be loath to see others replicate. The commander
ultimately overrules the JAG, believing he can rationalize the wedding caravan
as a military object making an effective contribution to military action, and
orders the strike.
160. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 12, art. 52(3).
161. A more sophisticated proportionality analysis would also take into account the deleterious
effects on military advantage of killing civilians if, for example, the death of civilians can be expected to
lead to the recruitment of many more enemy militants. As the Counterinsurgency Field Manual
insightfully notes, some actions that "provide a short-term military advantage" may actually "help the
enemy." DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY app. A, at A-5 (2006).
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This is an admittedly challenging case to review. The court will
ultimately have to determine whether the wedding procession was a lawful
target, whether the commander acted lawfully, and whether to credit the JAG's
analysis. However, making these determinations is no more challenging than
determining whether the government has established that a detainee was, in
fact, an enemy combatant on the basis of classified evidence162 or whether
Combatant Status Review Tribunals satisfy the requirements of due process.
163
We should bear in mind that judicial review of drone strikes does not require
judges to second guess conventional war decisions in hot battlefields. Drone
strikes do not take place in the fog of war where soldiers risking their lives
must make life and death decisions in a split second. Precisely because drone
strikes occur in contexts with no threat to U.S. service personnel, they transpire
and can be reviewed on much more objective grounds. Courts would review
commanders' actions in the safety and calm of a drone command center,
specifically for their compliance with the legal requirements of identifying and
distinguishing military from civilian objectives and weighing the expected
civilian casualties against the expected military advantage. Given our courts'
demonstrated competency and our national and military commitment to the
laws of war, it is time for the courts to meet the challenge of reviewing the
legality of drone strikes that appear to violate distinction or proportionality.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that ex post judicial review of drone strikes would make us
both more secure and more faithful to our core constitutional commitments.
The constitutional demand for judicial review of military force is the most
serious check on the executive in a democratic society of law. Vindicating the
lawfulness and legitimacy of drone strikes is crucial to our future security given
our permanent counter-terrorism footing. Our allies are already demanding
legal assurances in exchange for intelligence cooperation and we should
demand judicial review to restore our constitutional balance of powers.
Despite the challenges inherent in accurately and proportionately
targeting enemy militants with drones, drone strikes have the potential to be
paradigm cases of compliance with the laws of war. Drone strikes are
purportedly among the most thoroughly researched, contemplated, and
reviewed decisions in the history of warfare. Given the military's own
application of the laws of distinction and proportionality to targeting,
retrospectively reviewing whether the commanding officers reasonably
complied with these legal demands should be a judicial task wholly within the
competence of our courts.
Given the feasibility of ex post judicial review and its security and
constitutional advantages, the executive, the military, and our courts should all
support ex post judicial review drone strikes. Even a case that merely passes the
162. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Bensayah
v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
163. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008).
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pleading stage will have a tremendous effect on reinforcing the rule of law and
vindicating the program. Reassuring our allies abroad of the legality of the
program will have immediate national security benefits through enhanced
intelligence sharing. Reassuring congressional critics and the American people
of the legality of the program will help restore our constitutional balance of
powers and democratic legitimacy for the most serious action that government
can take in our name. With no end to counterterrorism operations in sight and
the military turning overwhelmingly to unmanned aircraft, the lawfulness and
legitimacy of the drone program is essential to an effective national security
strategy going forward.
